Method
in Mufid's Kalam and in
Christian Theology
By: Martin McDermott
I.
Al-Mufid's Notion of Kalám
II. Al-Mufid's Kalám in Practice
III. Comparison with Theology
Notes
I do not think I can tell you
anything new about al-Shaykh. Most of you are scholars in his tradition and you study his
works and know his sources to a degree and with a facility that I shall never attain. I
have, though, and do, make an effort to understand his kalám as best I can, and to
understand what he was doing, and what he meant to do and tried to do.
In a book I wrote about al-Shaykh
al-Mufid, I provisionally translated 'ilm al-kalám by the word
"theology", as its closest equivalent in the languages of the West. It is not a
very satisfactory translation, for 'ilm al-kalám is not quite the same as what
Christians call "theology." Now my purpose is to come back to these two terms
and consider a few differences between what al-Mufid, the mutakallim was doing in
his discipline and what Christians mean by theology. To be quite plain, I am thinking
inside my own tradition, which is that of a Catholic Christian whose model and ideal in
theology is Thomas Aquinas.
I admit that my aim here is
personal, simply to answer a question I have long ago asked myself but have not
investigated before. I am trying today to see the two methods in comparison: that of 'ilm
al-kalám and of theology. Noting the differences helps me to understand al-Mufid
better, what he is aiming to do and what he is not aiming to do. Perhaps also it may help
you to understand Christian theology more, what it does and does not try to do.
My guide in all this has been the
monumental study by Louis Gardet and Georges Anawati, Introduction á la Théologie
Musulmane, which however suffers from the defect, recognized by its authors, of not
considering the Shi'ite mutakallimún.[1]
It is commonly said of 'ilm
al-kalám in general that it is a defensive apologetic, good in the opinion of some
Muslims, but not all. Al-Gazzáli thought 'ilm al-kalám to be a dangerous remedy,
useful only for protecting the faith of the people and silencing heretics.[2]
Ibn Khaldún's definition of 'ilm al-kalám is well known: "It is a science
that involves arguing with rational proofs in defence of articles of faith and refuting
innovators who deviate in their dogmas from the doctrines of the early generations and the
people of tradition. The core of these dogmas is the oneness of God."[3]
And yet surely the mutakallim,
in elaborating his defence of the propositions to be believed, is at the same time making
an effort to understand and to illuminate what it is that he believes.
This is what interests me in
al-Mufid.
Here is the fundamental
difference between kalám and theology. Kalám aims primarily to defend and
secondarily to illuminate; theology aims primarily to illuminate: to come to some
understanding of a mystery which the human mind cannot fully grasp, and only secondarily
to defend. Both hold that God is one. And we both, I presume, also hold that God is a
mystery that cannot be fully understood by the finite human mind. We both hold that
nothing in true revelation can contradict reason, for God is the author of both reason and
revelation. Yet God can also reveal things about Himself which are beyond our power to
understand fully.
My own interest is in the effort
at understanding and explaining the datum of revelation which al-Mufid makes in his kalám.
One of the important things al-Mufid did was to provide a rational substratum for the
Imamite faith during the absence of the Imam. He had to meet not only the objections of
outsiders but also the demands of believing Shi'ites for explanation of how what is
proposed for belief does not contradict what they already know.
I will try, then, (1) to say
something about al-Mufid's own notion of kalám, and (2) then see how he carried it
out, and after that (3) compare it with the theological method.
First of all, kalám is
for the specialists. Although ordinary believers were allowed to protect themselves by taqiyyah,
still, says al-Mufid, the Imams had commanded another group of the more learned, "to
face their adversaries openly in argument and call them to the truth."[4]
For, says al-Mufid, from the
first there had been in the Imamite community some who "used reason (nazar)
and disputed for the truth and repelled falsehood with arguments and proofs, for which the
Imams praised them."[5]
In assessing the method of his
teacher Ibn Bábawayh, al-Mufid made this reproach, that "he followed the method of
the traditionists, going by surface. meanings and shying away from the paths of reflection
(al-'i'tibár). This point of view harms the religion of the one who holds it, and
resting in it blocks rational inquiry (al-'istibsár)."[6]
From this criticism it is
possible to infer al-Mufid's own idea of what a mutakallim should do. He should
reflect and try to understand the meaning of the traditions that he has heard. This will
improve the quality of his own faith and so enable him more effectively to defend it
against the attacks of nonbelievers.
Man's first duty, according to
al-Mufid, is to know God.[7] Apparently, then, this comes even before
the duty to reason to knowledge of His existence.
Mere passive acceptance of
traditions on the part of those who are capable of reasoning, brings no reward, for
passive acceptance is not faith.[8]
This however does not mean to say
that all must be skilled in dialectic or capable of expressing their knowledge in debate
and disputation.[9] For nazar is not the same as munázarah.[10] Many of the common people, says al-Mufid, are able to have the
personal knowledge, based on reasoning, that puts them above the passive accepters of
another's word, without being themselves mutakallimún.
On the other hand, al-Mufid says
that "reason (al-'aql)needs revelation (al-sam') both in its premises
and in its conclusions, and it does not dispense with revelation for informing the
ignorant of how demonstration (al-istidlál) works. And an apostle is necessary for
the initial imposition of moral obligation and its beginning in the world."[11] This interdependence of reason and revelation is basic in al-Mufid's
system, and it is a pity that he did not theorize about it further in any of the writings
we have from him.
It is the contention of this
paper that al-Mufid did more than just argue against external opponents and refute
adversaries. While doing this, he also met to some extent another vital need of the
Imamite believer which had been performed by the Imams when they were available, but which
needed continuation in al-Mufid's time and still needs to be done along the lines he laid
out or along the lines laid out by his pupils and successors. That task is the rational
elaboration of the faith. What does this or that doctrine mean? How can I justify it
against the objections of my own mind? It is the task of giving an intellectual substratum
to what he believed. For the content of what is to be believed does not stand on reason
alone, but also on revelation (sam').
To this end, for example,
al-Mufid elaborates in al-'Ifsáh a fourfold proof of the need for an Imam: from
the Qur'an, from tradition, consensus, and from reason and experience. And the last part
of the proof, from reason and experience, rests upon two premises: one, that it is
impossible to carry out the legal duties of the believer without an Imam, and, second,
that God does not oblige what is impossible.[12] So one of the two
premises is based on revelation, and the second, that God does not oblige what is above
man's strength, is from reason.
Al-Mufid also argues agaisnt the
Ash'arites that God is just and does not command man beyond what he is capable of.[13] This leads him also to consider whether God acts for man's best
interests, and whether God does so because He is obliged in justice, or whether He puts
Himself under a kind of moral obligation rising from His nobility and generosity.[14] In deciding for the latter, al-Mufid is in agreement with the
Baghdadi Mu'tazilites against the Basran school.
But if God is not held by strict
justice, it would seem rather hazardous to claim that we know by reason what He may and
may not do. Hence this seems to be another reason why al-Mufid's thesis fits in well with
his other doctrine that reason ('aql) needs revelation (sam') to support it.
This would seem to be in line
with the prayer of Ibrahim to see how God would raise the dead. God replied, " 'Do
you not then believe?' He said, 'Yes! but to satisfy my own heart.' "[15]
It is not so much a question of whether it is so, but an effort to understand how it is
so. And in kalám, it is an effort more in the first operation of the mind (the
concept and what it means) rather than the second operation (the judgement) which deals
with the true and the false.
That is, the Imamite already
believes what the Imam says.
But still he wants to know how
this accords and harmonizes with other things which he knows by reason. So he asks, for
example, in al-Masá'il al-Hájibiyyah, how this or that Qur'anic verse can be
harmonized with the doctrine of the Imamites, e.g. on the purity of the People of the
House, with the verse: "And God only wishes to remove all impurity from you, Members
of the Family, and to make you pure and spotless"[16] This is
really asking for an explanation of the meaning of the verse which he can rationally
accept along with the doctrine that the Imams were already pure.
Or how certain actions of the
prophets or the Imams harmonize with their 'ismah, for example: if Ali knew what
would happen, why did he go to the mosque where he was assassinated, and why did al-Husayn
go to Kufah?[17] This leads al-Mufid to explain more fully what 'ismah
means and what it does not mean.
Granted. then, that the main
purpose of 'ilm al-kalám is to defend one's doctrine against deniers and enemies,
it remains that it also has a secondary function, which is to explain more fully the
meaning of the doctrine in order to meet the need of the believer for a fuller
understanding of what he believes. I think this second task of kalám looms large
in al-Mufid's work.
All that I have said so far may
perhaps seem obvious to you. Why do I elaborate on it? Because before coming to a study of
kalám and al-Mufid, I had been trained in theology, and my own curiousity leads
me- to ask what are the similarities and what are the differences between the two
sciences. I would like to note three differences: one of emphasis, another of function,
and of subject matter.
In theology, the function of
defensive apologetic is secondary, relegated to a minor ancillary role. For theology is
mainly a dialogue between believers rather than with unbelievers. Where the dialogue is
with unbelievers, one is in the realm of philosophy or what is called natural theology,
which appeals only to what can be proved by unaided reason. And in defending one's
religious doctrine against outside attacks, or in seeking to convince a nonbeliever of its
truth, one is using the science called apologetics, not theology proper.
For the primary aim of theology
is "understanding of the faith". Or as Augustine, one of the formers of the
theological tradition said, "I believe in order that I may understand, and I
understand in order that I may believe better."[18] It uses
reason in order to try to see the harmony between the doctrines among themselves, and also
how they lead man to his last end, which is the direct knowledge of God in heaven. In
other words, if the parts of a theological system contradict one another or do not fit in
with one another, the system falls. But the theologian as such does not make it his
business to prove the credibility of what he believes to a nonbeliever.
That is the task of the
philosopher or the apologist. The theologian seeks not so much to defend as to deepen his
faith, and by contemplating with his reason what he believes to be revealed truths, to see
connections between them and draw conclusions from them. In doing this he aims to know God
better, even though God will remain a mystery to him. And the fruit of this effort should
ordinarily be love.
It must be said too that another
difference between the subject matter of kalám and that of theology is that kalám
does not deal expressly with mysteries that surpass our understanding.
Of course, every Muslim will
admit at once that there are many things about God and what pertains to Him, al-ghayb,
beyond the understanding of His creatures. However the task of kalám is not to
treat of those mysteries. The theologian, in fact, treats many of the same subjects as the
mutakallim, but under a different light:
that of faith. And theology holds
of course that many truths about God (that He exists, that He is One, that He rewards the
good and punishes the evil, etc.) can be proved by reason alone, but that revelation is
necessary in practice so that these truths can be arrived at by all, more quickly, easily,
and certainly and without error being mixed in.
For faith, in the theologian's
view, is a gift which God offers and man can accept. When he accepts it, it raises him
above his own natural powers and enables him to believe not on the strength of proofs,
which may or may not be present, but because God says so.
What the theologian is trying to
do by using his reason with the aid of this gift of faith is to come to some knowledge of
God which stands between the knowledge of a child, who simply believes, and the direct
knowledge of God which is experienced in love by those who contemplate Him in heaven.
Back to
Index of Articles
[1] Paris:
Vrin, 1948. This was translated by Subhi al-Sálih and Farid Jabr, Falsafat al-fikr
al-dini bayn al-'Islam wal-masihiyyah" .Beirut, Dár al-'Ilm lil-Maláyin, 1969, 3
vols.
[2] Ihyá'
"ulúm al-din, 1, 174, cited in Gardet-Anawati, p. 71.
[3] A'l-Muqaddimah, 1164,
Gardet-Anawati, p. 309.
[4] Tash ih
al-'i'tiqádát, p. 66, M. McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-M'ufid, Beirut: Dar
El-Machreq, 1978, p. 317.
[5] Tashih pp. 26-7, Theology" p. 315.
[6] Tashih, p. 67.
[7] Theology" p. 58, citing al-Karájaki, Kanz
al-fawá'id.
[8] Al-Fusúl al-mukhtárah, p. 78, Theology" p. 243.
[9] Al-Fusúl, p. 79, Theology, p. 245.
[10] Tashih, p. 28, Theology" p. 316.
[11] Awá'il, pp. 11-12, Theology, p. 60.
[12] Al-'Ifsáh. fi imámat Amir al-Mu'minin, pp. 3-4,
Theology, p. 120.
[13] Awá'il, pp. 24-25, Theology, p. 156.
[14] Awá'il, p. 26, Theology, p. 77.
[15] Súrat al-Baqarah, 2:260.
[16] Súrat al-'Ahzáb, 33:33; al-Masá'il al-hájibiyyah,
Q.l.
[17] I bid., Q. 20.
[18] Sermon 43, 7, 9.
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